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The paper shows that the standing of theory in the field of mergers and acquisitions is weak 
for at least three reasons. Research is best described as a battlefield of ad hoc theory testing 
leaving behind a fragmented field. Research has focused traditionally on high intensity 
markets under the Anglo-Saxon variant of capitalism. Empirical evaluation is prone to be 
inexact and suffers among other from significant aggregation problems between the micro  
(firm performance) and macro level (economic growth). The deficiencies in the standing of 
theory will be reflected in weak institutions to handle the political processes concerning 
value, liquidity, efficiency and fairness aspects that affect the market for corporate assets 
within and across different variants of capitalism.  








The objective of the paper is to outline a research agenda and policy dilemmas from a 
research project that combines neoclassical theory, the resource based view of the firm and 
institutional theory in an attempt to formulate a more general theory of mergers and 
acquisitions. Towards this objective the paper poses the following questions 1) What can we 
learn from the existing literature?, 2) What are the blank spots in our knowledge about 
mergers and acquisitions? and 3) What are the potential dilemmas in a public policy 
perspective?  
 
To date research in business and economics on mergers and acquisitions has been highly 
fragmented and there is no consensus in sight as to the relative societal value of having a 
well-functioning market for corporate assets. This is problematic in a world where 
investments take place increasingly with existing rather than new assets (Nitzan, 2001, 
Andrade et al., 2001). Whereas neoclassical theory sees the benefit of this market in terms 
of transferring assets from firms with ‘bad’ production functions to firms with ‘good’ 
production functions, the managerial literature shifts the focus to that of ‘an arena in which 
managerial teams compete for the rights to manage resources’.
1 This view has also been 
evolving with the  behavioral model of the time (e.g. big is beautiful, empire building, core 
capabilities and maximized stock returns), culminating today in a differentiation between the 
strategic acquirer, the hubris acquirer and the financial acquirer in the management 
literature.  
 
From these fundamental positions both the resource based view and institutional theory may 
have additional insights to offer even though the baby (synergy) has been thrown out with the 
bathwater by many researchers. Also a look outside the ordinary research lab of the US (one 
of the most highly developed market for corporate assets in the world) could provide new 
insights. All forms of capitalism are not the same and within each variant of capitalism each 
market is subject to its own specific institutions.  
 
A resource based view may take us even farther than 2+2 is 5. Mergers and acquisitions to 
date is the only method by which the unique resources of firms that are organizationally 
embedded can be passed on from one firm to another and hence also potentially survive 
across generations. The process of foreign direct investment is a testament to the fact that 





respect is also the mergers and acquisitions that take place among small and medium sized 
enterprises and that many new business startups are buy-ups of small existing business or 
the remnants of an earlier entrepreneur’s failed effort.  
 
Hence from a resource based view mergers and acquisitions are potentially about grasping 
synergy where outcomes of recombining assets are uncertain. But even more fundamentally 
mergers and acquisitions are about the recycling of firm-specific resources and hence relates 
to the sustainability of the economic system with respect to an efficient reuse of those 
resources that are worth saving and a discarding of those that are not. In Eastern Europe 
more than anywhere else did this become clear on the eve of socialism. Experienced 
entrepreneurs or owners and managers of similar assets are those best capable to judge the 
value of such resources that have been put up for sale. The absence of a capital class in 
Eastern Europe was the main problem of privatization, and more so because of the vacuum 
in accumulated skills and complementary assets that the absence of such a class created. 
Therefore the importance of a well-functioning market for corporate assets under each 
variant of capitalism should not be underestimated.  
 
The market for corporate assets may need in many instances more intervention effort but not 
necessarily in the traditional competition regulating way as is the main topic of the last part of 
this essay. It is also questioned whether policy advice is transferable across variants of 
capitalism. Here the standing of theory seems important, because the societal value of the 
market for corporate assets also depends on how we perceive it and hence how we 
construct rules to regulate it. 
 





2. The frequency of mergers and acquisitions and variants of   
capitalism 
 
In the perspective of the frequency of measurable acquisitions using the Zephyr database, 
the US topped with more than 80,000 acquisition events during the last ten year period, 
followed by the UK with almost 54,000 events and Australia with more than 20,000 events. 
Adjusting for country size these numbers suggest that Australia, the UK, Denmark and 
Holland are among the countries with the highest frequency of events per capita in the world. 
Despite the advances of European Integration on the continent these numbers often dwarf 
the market for corporate assets even in major economies such as France, Spain, Italy and 
Germany all of which had less than 20,000 events in the same period. In this perspective 
Japan is also an outlier with very few events in per capita terms. 
 
Table 1: Number of events by selected countries, 2000-2010       
 
Country      No. of events1/  Events per   National events2/  
       1,000 capita  (percentage)  
Anglo-Saxon 
USA     80,303    0.27    81 
UK     53,673    0.89    58 
Australia    20,353    1.00    51 
 
Continental European 
France     18,590    0.31    58 
Germany    16,264    0.20    60 
Italy     13,376    0.23    49 
Spain     9,983    0.23    67 
Holland   8,013    0.49    63 
Denmark    4,730    0.87    51 
 
Confucian  
China     11,153    0.01    42 
Japan     8,119    0.06    66 
South  Korea    5,883    0.12    46 
 
Other emerging markets 
Russia     24,567    0.17    59 
India     8,032    0.01    52 
South  Africa    4,717    0.10    45 
Malaysia    4,627    0.18    67 
Poland     3,749    0.10    48 
Brazil     2,799    0.02    51 
Turkey     775    0.01    49     
Notes  1/  Events are here defined broadly to include mergers, acquisitions of, joint ventures with  
                   and the purchase of minority stakes in targets located in each country. 
  2/ To national events are counted the cases where both the target and acquirer are  
       located in the specified country.               





According to Groenewegen (1997) at least three different types or variants of capitalism are 
present in today’s global economy: the Anglo-Saxon variant of shareholder capitalism, the 
continental or European variant of state capitalism and the Japanese or Confucian variant of 
stakeholder capitalism. Last but not least an emerging and highly plural type of capitalism is 
emerging in various forms around the world in 26 major economies that span most of the 
continents. Here according to investment bankers a critical mass of markets and investment 
opportunities have come into existence since the conclusion of the Uruguay Round. 
 
The numbers presented in Table 1 suggest that the frequency of the events (mergers and 
acquisitions) is strongly related with the prevailing economic system or variant of capitalism. 
This is not surprising, because the number of firms with more than 250 employees is much 
lower outside the Anglo-Saxon world. For example, experts in Turkey suggest that the very 
low number of observable events in this country is partly explained by the limited number of 
targets compared with for example the UK market. Besides this, when firms are organized in 
large industrial groups it may create a much stronger inertia in asset drift over time and also 
other mechanisms may work to solve the problems that the market for corporate assets 
solves in the Anglo-Saxon system.
2  
 




Table 2 gives an overview of the different theoretical schools within business and economics 
that have contributed to the literature on mergers and acquisitions. This literature is generally 
fragmented and has been driven more by ad hoc hypothesis testing rather than theory 
building. Also, authors within each school often disagree about the predictions of each 
branch of theory. I have tried to reproduce the various positions to the best of my knowledge 
and understanding of the available texts. In terms of the empirical literature I have only 
selectively included contributions that I found where either strongly confirming or negating 
the theories discussed. Many findings do not have clear implications for giving a concise 





Table 2. Theories of the firm - motives and predictions for M&As  
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Neoclassical theory has focused on the relative worth of tangible or physical capital assets to 
firms at different points in time. The market for corporate assets is viewed as serving the 
function of shifting or trading physical assets among firms. For example, the famous q theory 
has been used as a way to show the opportunity cost of investing in new assets relative to 
old assets.
 3This has been interpreted so that q represents the buy to build ratio. When q is 
high it is a signal that it is more expensive to acquire existing assets and vice versa. 
However, this has been strongly rejected due to the empirical fact that waves in acquisitions 
typically take place during periods when q is high (Nitzan, 2001). This has again led to 
different revisionist attempts within and beyond the neoclassical school. For example, 
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) revive the theory by offering a model that shows that the 
dispersion in q gives incentive for shifting physical assets from low q firms to high q firms – or 
in other words reinterpret the theory so that the market for corporate assets serve to move 
the resources (physical assets) to their highest return within each industry. The net effect is a 
one-way technology transfer effect. The financial literature based on stock market data has 
provided a wealth of evidence in support hereof, even though the significance of these 
results are disputed.
4 It has been more difficult for empirical researchers based on 
accounting data to establish the long run gains and that high q firms take over low q firms 





produced by Andrade and Stafford (2004) for the US lends some support to the q theory 
especially in declining industries. 
 
The fact that acquisitions are on the increase during periods when q was high or on the 
increase (high profitability or high valuation episodes or both) has been a central empirical 
regularity for other schools of thought on acquisitions. 
 
In the beginning the managerial school explained the evolving market for corporate assets 
with the change in assumption from profit maximizing owners to managers that may be in de 
facto control and pursue objectives that deviate from the interests of the owners (Marris, 
1966, Baumol, 1967). Veblen (1929) originally conceived of this problem especially in his last 
work  Absentee Ownership. Hence acquisitions become one important method by which 
managers can pursue effective sales growth. Related explanations are that large firms are 
more likely to grow through this method because of their easier access to finance the asset 
purchases (Jensen, 1986). The most advanced hypothesis under the managerial theories is 
offered in Jensen and Ruback (1983) (see also Jensen, 1988) who see the market for 
corporate assets as a market where competition among top management teams can take 
place. This also lends a new focus in terms of efficiency implications, because a well-
functioning market for corporate assets can help to solve the corporate governance problem. 
The threat of takeover works as a disciplining device on managers and inefficient managers 
can be more easily replaced. Other branches of the managerial school have focused on the 
irrationality of mangers (hubris) or the increasing tendency of managers to be compensated 
in ways that make them benefit either directly or indirectly from increasing the value of their 
stock or engaging in the market for corporate assets (such as in Shleifer and Vishny, 2003).  
 
A major study conducted by Gugler et al. (2003) negates the general validity of managerial 
theory across all the countries included in their study, since on average the net sales effect 
was negative for target and acquiring entities combined. However, this study (ibid.) and 
another similar study (Gorton et al., 2009) also showed that the efficiency of the process 
(when measured on profitability) went down especially for acquisitions among the larger firms 
in the populations investigated. Jensen and Ruback (1983) lend their evidence more to the 
short event window studies using stock market data (Footnote 4). This evidence has 
however been placed in question by subsequent management researchers, who suggest that 
overvaluation aspects may lead to the exact opposite being true – e.g. that low q firms take 









A different line of inquiry has been pursued in strategic management. Here the central tenet 
is that acquisitions exist to exploit synergies in the knowledge resources of firms (Mahone 
and Pandian, 1992, Anand and Singh, 1997, Barney et al., 2001).  Chatterjee (1986) defines 
three categories of synergies: collusive, production related and financial. Where horizontal 
agreements have the highest synergy potential (all three types), vertically related a medium 
potential (production related and financial) and unrelated agreements the lowest potential 
(only financial). Again are the ideas of resource based scholars in some ways similar to 
those of the neoclassical economist. However, there is an important shift in emphasis from 
tangible to intangible assets.  The aim is to combine knowledge resources toward their 
highest returns. Also, unlike neoclassical scholars, resource based economist often work 
with concepts such as uncertainty and bounded rationality. Synergy development can in this 
respect be thought of as a two way technology transfer effect – or the emergence of a ‘new’ 
production function that draws on the best in both firms (Larson and Finkelstein, 1999, Lyles 
and Salk, 1996). However, this is not without risk and uncertainty as the quest for synergy 
can fail (Toth, 2007). Well-designed empirical tests in strategic management have rendered 
strong support for the resource based view (Capron, 1999). Researchers from outside 
strategic management have also documented synergy effects, however, especially when 
there was a large technological distance between the target and acquirer. 
6 
 
Much less treated and hardly tested is the transaction cost economic perspective on firms. 
However, due to its centrality among institutional scholars working at the level of the firm I did 
not wish to omit it. From a theory viewpoint the transaction cost approach has clear 
predictions since high transaction cost should be an argument for internalizing transactions 
which the market for corporate assets can help to achieve.
7 However, it seems that the 
theory is best suited towards explaining particular cases of acquisitions that happen in 
relation to auxiliary or vertically related activities of the firm (Coase, 1937). It can hardly 
explain the motive for horizontal acquisitions – e.g. the acquisition of activities that is 
duplicating what the firm is already doing.
8 Also, due to the difficulty of measuring transaction 
cost there is hardly any applied work available under this tradition.
9 
 
Next to the transaction cost theory is added a last column which lacks a central theory of the 
firm. Some scholars claim that this particular institutional perspective belongs together with 





institutional economics may be somewhat misleading for others.
10 It stands last next to the 
transaction cost theory that has been developed by institutional scholars such as Coase 
(1937) and Williamson (1973). Because this perspective on mergers and acquisitions does 
not belong together specifically with any of the theories of the firm. It can stand alone. It does 
not give a microeconomic but rather an institutional thesis on the motivations for mergers and 
acquisitions. The central tenet is that it is not factors in firms but factors in the environment 
that causes the processes to take place in waves. Interestingly, Veblen an institutional 
economist saw this explanation as strongly related with the phenomena of managerialism in 
the US system why I drew the suggestive connection between institutional theory and 
managerialism. If managers are not rational or we have no rational explanation such as sales 
growth to explain why they behave as they do, maybe an alternative explanation is to be 
found in the institutions that guide them (including investment banking and business school 
teachings). Recent years has produced a critical mass of empirical evidence in support of the 
institutional theory of why mergers and acquisitions take place in waves (e.g. Cox and 




4. Blank spots and biases in the existing literature 
 
 
Validity problems in acquisition research 
Focusing on the results of accounting research which is central for long-run firm performance 
and economic growth outcomes, empirical research suffers from two fundamental problems. 
Researchers have been aware of these for a long time but still search for new ways to solve 
them.  
 
One is to choose the right performance measure.
11 Research focusing on profitability more 
often reports negative results than research focusing on the other measures. One problem 
with profitability in relation to an average event window of 5 years studied is that it may be a 
much too short perspective. Another problem is to focus on EBIT data for taxation and 
amortization writing practices. EBITDA may be a better candidate for calculating profitability 
also depending on the specific taxation and accounting regime of each country. In relation to 
the problem of choosing the right performance measure, are also questions about the unit of 
analysis (e.g. target, buyer and seller or combinations of these) and the length of the event 






Another major problem identified by applied researchers in the field is the question of who 
the firms that are subject to acquisition events should be compared to. A very stringent 
approach called propensity score matching has developed in the literature where it has 
become customary to compare for example target data with data for very similar firms on a 
set of predefined characteristics that did not undergo the same treatment of acquisition. From 
an industrial economics viewpoint this may be problematic because the very proximate peers 
are those most likely to be affected by acquisition events in the industry (Chatterjee, 1986).  
 
 
Firm performance vs. economic growth 
Adam Smith portrayed a romantic view of the economy where if everyone goes about 
minding their own business it will also benefit the growth of the nation. In late modernity the 
view of many economists is somewhat different from that of Adam Smith. For example, game 
theory has clearly demonstrated that what is best for the economy as a whole is not 
necessarily the equilibrium that individual actors will pursue.  
 
Research on acquisitions suffer from a similar aggregation problem in the sense that what 
might be observed to be bad for firm performance (e.g. firm closure or layoffs) is not 
necessarily bad for the economy as a whole. What is bad for the efficiency of the market in 
the short run is not necessarily bad in the long run if we measure efficiency on other 
dimensions besides price. Many acquisitions may be strategically preemptive in the sense 
that owners are reacting to future projected changes in the industry. From an economic 
sorting perspective national firms projecting a decline in future performance may have as 
best alternative to merge with other similar national firms in the face of globalization and 
entry of new foreign competitors buying up national champions. In this perspective ex-post 
evaluation may not provide relevant evidence on the basis of which social judgment can be 
made. 
 
Hardly any connection has been made in the literature between what goes on in the market 
for corporate assets and how it interacts with other efficiency aspects of the economy 
(Kumar, 2000, Calderon et al., 2004).
12 Matching or sorting models can perhaps help to 
answer these questions and can be used to incorporate the role of institutions more 
specifically. To date the number of countries that have been studied has been limited. 
Economic growth researchers see the limited number of independent countries in the world 





research into variants of capitalism and neighboring disciplines such as corporate 
governance the world as a research lab still offers manifolds opportunities to learn more 
about the relationship between institutions, firm performance and economic growth. 
 
Large firm bias 
Most of the data and information uncovered about mergers and acquisitions suffer from a 
large firm bias. The same is true when it comes to the attention that policy-makers give to the 
market for corporate assets (see also Section 5). Moreoften the perspective has been to 
countervail the tendency of firm size becoming self-reinforcing (as treated under the 
managerial perspective in Section 3) and eventually exclusive to any kind of competition. 
Therefore the bias is important because it may have taken attention away both in research 
and policy-making from the entrepreneurial process and what can be done in terms of 
institution building and policy-making to aid SMEs to grow bigger or build assets from the 
bottom-up in ways that are beneficial for society. 
 
5. Institutions and policy  
 
 
Based on a broad reading of papers in business and economics this literature review of the 
relative standing of theory has demonstrated the potential pitfall of discarding mergers and 
acquisitions as irrational events that are impairing market efficiency and economic growth.  
With this the aim has also been to show the extensive research agenda that still exists in the 
field.  
 
Most schools of thought see the market for corporate assets as serving a vital function, even 
though the perspective depends on what each school perceives to be important in 
understanding the role of the firm: physical capital or tangible assets to neoclassical 
scholars, management teams to management scholars, firm-specific resources or intangible 
assets to resource based scholars and firm boundaries to transaction cost scholars. Besides 
these micro founded perspectives, the institutional thesis moves the attention to factors in the 
environment (institutional and technological change) that may give rise to mergers and 
acquisition events taking place in waves. 
 
Perhaps more weight should be given to the resource based view and institutional 
perspectives that often have received massive support in applied research designs that took 





in the study of economic growth and institutions has taught us (North, 1981), these two 
theories would combine well to give an understanding of how institutional change can affect 
firm agency (e.g. when values change trading positions in terms of reservation prices may 
also change). 
 
In the concluding part the aim is to offer a number of questions or dilemmas for public policy 
that could follow from such a different research agenda. 
The traditional policy stance towards mergers and acquisitions has been strongly influenced 
by the structure conduct performance paradigm dating back to the beginning of the 20
th 
century. Markets with only a few firms such as oligopolies may need regulation for the sake 
of society since everyone is a consumer and hence everyone benefits from more fair pricing 
practices. In this perspective mergers and acquisitions can potentially divert markets from 
efficient outcomes if they lead to an increase in the market power of individual firms. Evenett 
(2002) shows that institutions matter for intensity in this market because countries with pre-
closing merger reviews experience a halving in the intensity of crossborder acquisitions 
relative to countries with post-closing, voluntary or no merger reviews. 
 
New avenues for public policy emerge if the resource based view and the institutional 
theories are taken into account. Their inclusion leads up to a more difficult policy triangle 
rather than the one-dimensional policy space of more or less competition. The three corners 
of policy become instead competition, intellectual property rights and capital markets 
including corporate governance. These are the most important aspects of national institutions 
that affect the market for corporate assets in terms of value, liquidity, efficiency and fairness 
(Dibelius, 2002). Also I suggest to add the real economy at the base, because policy needs 
to take into account major shifts in policies and institutions that regulate the real economy 
such as investment and trade liberalization. For example, national policy-makers must 
beware of changes that shift regulatory issues between national and international domains 
and preempt these changes so that all firms (national as well as foreign) can be presented 
with fair solutions that are non-discriminating. 
















Capital markets development and corporate governance system is perhaps the most 
fundamental aspect of understanding why a market for corporate assets come into being or 
exist in the first place (Dibelius, 2002, Yurtoglu, 2000). The stock exchange is the central 
institution for giving rise to a system that attaches a marketable value to firms, a transparent 
trading system and hence also perceptions about a ‘fair’ place for valuation practices where 
transactions take place in the public rather than private realm. In variants of capitalism where 
banks are more important, the regulation surrounding the banking system may be vital for 
public disclosure in the area of trade in firm-specific assets. Bank-based capitalism is known 
to have a much less developed market for corporate assets (Picot, 2002). Typically this is 
anchored in a model where firms are organized in industrial groups (with or without the state 
as active participant). The banks themselves are often internal rather than external to these 
groups. Such models or variants of capitalism may need a completely different approach to 
regulation. Generally how the market for corporate assets work under those variants, to 
which extent and under what circumstances it has been more fair, liquid and effective is 
much understudied. Hence the preconditions for sound policy advice are largely non-
existent. In Germany the solution has been instead of merger reviews to establish a specific 
body to overview the market for corporate assets that consist in a wide range of experts from 
different fields (Dibelius, 2002).  
 
Intellectual property rights (IPR) institutions are the most fundamental in the aspect of 
corporate assets. In the absence of this type of institution it is almost impossible for firms to 
build knowledge resources (North, 1981). The problem is often that IPR discussions take 
place in a somewhat isolated or ethnocentric perspective of western views or in particular the 
Anglo-Saxon solution to the problem of property rights. (Not discarding that it may offer a 
The ‘real’ economy 
              IPR institutions  Competition regulation 
Capital Markets  
and 
Corporate Governance  





much superior system but only suggesting that it can be difficult to implement outside the 
Anglo-Saxon variant).  
 
Other institutions do exist besides the formal patenting system that provides some solution 
for this problem (Maskus, 2000). Especially informal institutions may be important such as 
trade secrets (which is true for Turkey and other emerging economies). But many institutional 
contexts are found to work to the general lack of property rights. Under state socialism the 
natural right principle is not acknowledged. In the Confucian variant individual inventions are 
viewed as drawing on a ‘common pool of past knowledge’ (Zimmerman and Chaudhry, 2009) 
combined with selective centralized state censorship. In Islamic capitalism the state also 
often sanctions the common right to intellectual property. How these different types of IPR 
systems work to the favor and disfavor of building and trading corporate assets is largely 
unknown? Most likely the lack of incentives
13 for using the patenting system will also work to 
the disfavor of a well-functioning market for corporate assets since it will work to reduce the 
marketable value of the resources held by firms. Picot (2002, Page 25-26) suggests that an 
international system in the area of mergers and acquisitions is emerging that may help to 
break down national transaction cost by ‘externalizing’ the forum of the market itself. Turkish 
firms increasingly do this by choosing the international rather than national forum (courts, 
organizations etc.) for contracting, arbitrage, registration and dispute resolution in the area of 
IPR. 
 
The relationship between the institutions regulating competition and the institutions regulating 
IPR has received some attention especially in the Anglo-Saxon literature. Two different 
positions exist. One holds that there is a fundamental dilemma between the two institutions, 
because one works to the favor of competition and the other to the favor of monopoly. Hence 
what the one institution seeks to achieve the other institution will undo. Another position 
holds that the two institutions serve complementary functions and that together they provide 
firms with the opportunities to create assets (value) and at the same time assuring that firms 
do not resort to unfair practices by distorting the competitive process.  
Mergers and acquisitions are more likely to be plenty and fair under institutions informed by 
the second view. First because the market for corporate assets must be preceded by the 
assignment of value to the assets of firms which can only happen with some kind of 
protection of IPR. Where then the competition institutions overview that the assignment of 
value or the use right over value property becomes less rather than more monopolistic over 
time. This again feeds back into the value creating potential of the firms in the 





incentive to renew their value potential if they perceive that their market power is not 
constant over time. Therefore competition regulation is also important.  
 
The perspective maintained about emerging markets especially from outside observers is 
that there is too little competition and that the core of the problem is to increase competition. 
However, this is often not the truth. The main problem seems moreoften to be a lack of 
protection of property rights for local entrepreneurs and local firms and that competition when 
markets do exist is extremely high. Hence the problem for developing a sound market for 
corporate assets in emerging markets where also local firms will perceive themselves as fair 
participants in the face of foreign competition is often obstructed by ill-fetched conceptions 
about IPR issues on both sides. In such seas of competition and transaction cost it is 
perhaps not strange that the most valuable assets have been carefully vaulted among a few 
powerful impenetrable industrial groups. 
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1 Jensen and Ruback, 1983, Page 5. 
 
2 The numbers may be comparatively downwards or upwards biased especially for the non-western countries due 
to a more selective data coverage for these countries. For example, Bureau Van Dijk has a very good data 
coverage for Russia, whereas the coverage is expected to be significantly downward biased for countries such as 
India and China. 
 
3 Traditionally q is defined and measured as the market value of the firm (using information about its stock prices) 
divided with the book value of its total assets. An accounting variant is to divide ROA with the going rate of 
interest. See also Tobin and Brainard (1977). 




                                                                                                                                                          
 
4 Analysis based on stock market data from the Anglo-Sazon countries show that the great beneficiaries of 
acquisitions are target firm shareholders whereas the net benefit for the acquiring firms’ shareholders is quite 
small (Jensen, 1988, Andrade et al., 2001, Picot, 2002, Silva Rossa and Walter, 2004). 
 
5 The efficient market hypothesis implies that there should be a high correlation between stock market based 
measures of q and its accounting equivalent – see also the previous Endnote 3. 
 
6 Suggesting that what is captured is more like a one-way technology transfer effect (Harris and Robinson 2002, 
Conyn et al., 2002, Piscitello and Rabbiosi, 2002, Arnold and Javorcik, 2005, Bertrand and Zitouna, 2005, and 
Karpaty,2007.) 
 
7 According to this theory firms perceive higher transaction cost in environments or industries where uncertainty, 
higher contracting frequency, asset specificity, opportunism and factors of limited rationality prevail (Williamson, 
1973). 
 
8 This is problematic since most acquisitions are of the horizontal type. Even in a crossborder perspective 
transaction cost theory has relatively little to say about how the firm should invest (Greenfield vs. Acquisition). 
 
9 Transaction cost are illusive types of cost, according to the theory, firms exist to forego them or minimize them. 
It gives however an important fundamental explanation for why the large industrial groups exist in the first place. 
 
10 Today institutionalism is as plural a discipline within economics as economics itself. Indicating that it is a 
perspective that is being incorporated across all subdisiciplines. Hence it does not belong only with antropology 
and sociology at the one end or law and economcis at the other end, nor does it belong with one particular theory 
of the firm. 
 
11 Profitability is the central measure in strategic management research whereas productivity is the central 
measure in economics. Sales growth is also central for management researchers because of the behavioral 
assumption that managers seek sales growth rather than maximized profits. Other important measures include 
innovation, employment growth and markups. 
 
12 Jensen (1988) estimates the social value of an efficient market to be quite high (e.g. equivalent to half of all 
cash dividends paid out to investors).  
 
13 In emerging forms of capitalism it is often the foreign firms that are most active users of the new patenting 
system. Especially in variants where trade secrets and a general resort to secrecy is common there may be very 
large barriers to the development of an Anglo-Saxon patenting system if enforcement is perceived to be unfair or 
problematic. By using patenting the firms will make themselves more vulnerable since they codify their secrets 
and hence make them easily reproducible. The problem can also be founded in a generally distrustful relationship 
between the state and private firms. This demonstrates strongly opposing values among different variants of 
capitalism that must be overcome before the new institutions can take any effect. 
 